In many theorem proving applications, a proper treatment of equational theories or equality is mandatory. In this paper we show how to integrate a modern treatment of equality in the Model Evolution calculus (ME), a first-order version of the propositional DPLL procedure. The new calculus, ME E , is a proper extension of the ME calculus without equality. Like ME it maintains an explicit candidate model, which is searched for by DPLL-style splitting. For equational reasoning ME E uses an adapted version of the superposition inference rule, where equations used for superposition are drawn (only) from the candidate model. The calculus also features a generic, semantically justified simplification rule which covers many simplification techniques known from superposition-style theorem proving. Our main theoretical result is the correctness of the ME E calculus in the presence of very general redundancy elimination criteria. We also describe our implementation of the calculus, the E-Darwin system, and we report on practical experiments with it on the TPTP problems library.
Introduction
The Model Evolution (ME) Calculus [7, 9] is a refutational calculus for clause logic developed as a first-order extension of the propositional DPLL procedure [14] . Compared to its predecessor, the FDPLL calculus [4] , ME lifts to first-order logic without equality not just the core of the DPLL procedure, the splitting rule, but also its simplification rules, which are crucial for its practical feasibility.
Our implementation of ME, the Darwin theorem prover [6] , performs well in some domains but, unsurprisingly, not on problems with equality which it can treat only with the explicit addition of equality axioms. This is a serious shortcoming in practice because the majority of automated reasoning applications work in logics with equality. In [8] we addressed the problem by proposing an extension of ME with dedicated inference rules for equality reasoning. These rules were centered around a version the ordered paramodulation inference rule adapted to ME. This paper presents an extensively revised and improved version of that calculus, called ME E , that relies more heavily on notions and techniques originally developed for the Superposition calculus [2] . As a result, ME E features more powerful redundancy criteria, and, by means of selection functions, removes some non-determinism from the calculus in [8] . We prove the soundness and completeness of ME E in full detail and discuss an initial implementation in the E-Darwin theorem prover, largely based on Darwin. The completeness proof is obtained as an extension of the ME completeness proof by adapting techniques from the Bachmair/Ganzinger framework developed for proving the completeness of superposition [2, 26, e.g.] . The underlying model construction technique allows us to justify a rather general simplification rule on semantic grounds. The simplification rule is based on a general redundancy criterion that covers many simplification techniques known from superposition-style theorem proving.
These adaptations are non-trivial because of the rather different layout of the two calculi. While superposition maintains clause sets as its main data structure, ME E works with a set of literals, which we call a context, and a set of (constrained) clauses. ME E has, correspondingly, two kinds of inference rules, one for modifying contexts, and one for deriving new (constrained) clauses, with the latter consisting mostly of unit-superposition style inference rule. Since there is no counterpart to contexts in superposition calculi, the inference rules on contexts are specific to our calculus, as are the redundancy criteria we present.
Related Work. Like ME, the ME E calculus is related to instance based methods (IMs) [5, 21] , a family of calculi and proof procedures for first-order (clausal) logic that share the principle of carrying out proof search by maintaining a set of instances of input clauses and analyzing it for satisfiability until completion. Most IMs are based on resolving pairs of complementary literals (connections) from two clauses in order to determine these instances. In contrast, ME's splitting rule is based on evaluating all literals of a single clause against a current candidate model in order to determine an instance. See [9] for a more detailed discussion of ME in relation to IMs, which also applies to ME E when equality is not an issue.
There are only a few IMs that include inference rules for equality reasoning. Ordered Semantic Hyperlinking (OSHL) by Plaisted and Zhu [29] uses rewriting and narrowing (paramodulation) with unit equations, but requires some other mechanism such as Brand's transformation to handle equations that appear in nonunit clauses.
To our knowledge there are only two IMs that have been extended with dedicated equality inference rules for full equational clausal logic. One of them is described by Ganzinger and Korovin [18] as an extension of the earlier IM by the same authors [17] . It is conceptually rather different from ME E : the main inference rule for equational reasoning requires to refute, as a subtask, a set of unit clauses (which is obtained by pick-ing literals from the current clause set). More closely related to ME E is an IM based on disconnection tableaux by Letz and Stenz, a successor of Billon's disconnection method [12] . 2 Letz and Stenz discuss various ways of integrating equality reasoning in disconnection tableaux [22] , including a variant based on ordered paramodulation. These paramodulation inferences combine (equational) branch literals and clauses into new clauses, where the equation used for paramodulation is added in negated form (as a condition) to the paramodulant. Our main equality inference rules work similarly, and in this sense the calculus of [22] and ME E are conceptually related. But it is perhaps fair to say that ME E features more powerful and general concepts of redundancy detection and elimination.
Finally, ME has been combined with the superposition calculus in a single framework, including equality inference rules by Baumgartner and Waldmann [10] . On the one hand, by this very combination, their calculus is more general than ME E . On the other hand, ME E has some features that are not present in that calculus: the concept of universal variables, which enable the optional derivation rules Assert and Compact and lead to a more powerful redundancy criterion. Another difference lies in the way constraint clauses are ordered, which enables additional redundancy criteria and that would be non-trivial to integrate in the calculus in [10] .
Paper organization. We start with an informal explanation of the main ideas behind the ME E calculus in Section 2. After some technical preliminaries in Section 3 we provide a more formal treatment of the main data structures of the calculus in Section 4, where we describe contexts and their associated interpretations, and Section 5, where we describe constrained clauses and inference rules for performing equality reasoning on them. We then present the ME E calculus in Section 6, and discuss its correctness in Section 7. In Section 8 we discuss an initial implementation of the calculus together with comparative experimental results. We conclude in Section 9, suggesting a few directions for further research. Detailed proofs of all the results in the paper can be found in the appendix.
Main Ideas
Similarly to the ME calculus, ME E is informally best described with an eye to the propositional DPLL procedure it extends. DPLL can be viewed as a procedure that searches the space of possible interpretations for a given clause set until it finds one that satisfies the clause set, if it exists. This can be done by keeping a current candidate model and repairing it as needed until it satisfies every input clause. The repairs are done incrementally by changing the truth value of one (propositional) clause literal at a time, and involve a non-deterministic guess, a "split", on whether the value of a selected literal should be changed or kept as it is. The number of guesses is reduced thanks to a constraint propagation process, usually referred to as "unit propagation", that is able to deduce deterministically the value of some input literals.
Both ME and ME E lift this idea to first-order logic by (i) maintaining a first-order candidate model, (ii) deriving new clauses based on that model, (iii) identifying instances of derived clauses that are falsified by the model, and (iv) repairing the model incrementally until it satisfies all of those instances. The main difference between the two calculi is that ME works with Herbrand models while ME E works with equational models, or E-interpretations, that is, Herbrand interpretations in which the equality symbol is the only predicate symbol and always denotes a congruence relation. The current E-interpretation is constructed from the current context, a finite set of directed equational literals processed by the calculus. As we will show, each context Λ determines a (convergent) ground rewrite system R Λ . The E-interpretation associated with the context is the congruence closure R Λ of R Λ .
Context literals can be of two types: universal and parametric. As we will see later, the difference between the two lies in how they constrain the possible modifications of a context and, as a consequence, the possible repairs to its induced E-interpretation. As far as determining the induced E-interpretation, however, the two types of context literals are interchangeable.
For convenience, let us say that a context Λ satisfies/falsifies a literal or a clause if its associated E-interpretation R Λ does so. As mentioned above, during the course of a derivation, the current context Λ is modified if it falsifies a current, derived clause. Such a repair involves in essence two steps: (i) identifying an instance of a current clause that is falsified by the current context, and (ii) adding a new literal the context so that the new context satisfies that instance.
The first step is achieved by deriving new clauses by applying (unit) superpositionstyle inference rules to literals in the context and clauses in the current clause set until an empty clause is derived.
Each derived clause carries with it a constraint recording all the equalities and disequalities of Λ involved in the inferences used to derive it. In particular, a derived empty clause D has the form · Γ where is the empty disjunction and Γ, a set of equational literals, is the constraint.
A (ground) constraint is satisfied by a context Λ if all of its equalities are contained in R Λ , the ground rewrite system induced by Λ, and none of its disequalities is. The clause D then is falsified if for some substitution σ, Γσ is satisfied in this sense. In that case, the calculus addresses the problem by adding to Λ, if possible, (a variant of) the complement K of some literal K in Γ. 3 This typically ensures that the new context satisfies some (possibly, all) ground instances of K and, as a consequence, some ground instances of D-if some instances of D remain falsified, a new empty clause reflecting that will be derivable later. Note that the rules of ME E do not actually work with R Λ but with the literals in Λ and their instances obtained by unification with clause literals. The rewrite system R Λ , a conceptual construction we use to explain the calculus and prove its completeness, is only approximated at the calculus level. In practice, this may lead sometimes to unnecessary inferences. That, however, is not a problem from a correctness perspective as long as all inferences theoretically necessary for completeness are carried out.
The choice to repair the context with the complement of a constraint literal K of · Γ is don't-know non-deterministic since it just produces a local repair that may fail to lead to a model for the input clause set. Hence, it must be paired in the calculus with a corresponding complementary action which consists in adding a suitably Skolemized version of K instead of K. While that does not repair the context, it constitutes progress in the derivation since it effectively forces the calculus to look at other constraint literals from the empty clause for repairing the context. When no constraint literals can be used, the context is unrepairable and backtracking to a previous choice point becomes necessary. With a fair derivation strategy, the calculus guarantees that whenever no more clauses are derivable (modulo redundancy) and the context is repaired, perhaps in the limit, to satisfy all current constrained empty clauses, its associated E-interpretation is a model of the input clause set.
For an example of how a derivation might proceed consider the following input clause set Φ 0 :
where x is a variable and t a constant. The initial context, Λ 0 , is empty. Its associated E-interpretation is the identity relation over the set T (Σ) of all ground Σ-terms, where Σ is the signature of Φ 0 . Clearly, Γ 0 falsifies each clause in Φ 0 . The calculus may derive, say, the constrained clauses
The constraint of each derived clause can be understood as a set of preconditions for the clause. Roughly speaking, it represents a set of ground facts that held in the current interpretation at the time the clause was derived. If later one of these ground facts does not hold anymore because of changes to the context, the corresponding ground instances of the constrained clause are, in essence, removed from consideration. For instance, the constraint of clause (4) states that when the clause was derived (from clause (1)) all ground instances of P( f (x)) t were satisfied in the current context. The derivation of empty constrained clauses above indicates that the current context needs to be repaired. For clause (6) the only possible repair is to add the universal literal g(x) ≈ x to Λ 0 . As we will see, the alternative, namely adding g(k) k for a fresh Skolem constant k, not only will fail to repair the context (as the new one will still falsify every ground instance of (6)) but it will also make it unrepairable with respect to (6) . With the new context Λ 1 = {g(x) ≈ x}, the induced rewrite system R Λ 1 is a certain minimal subset of E = {g(t) ≈ t | t ∈ T (Σ)} having the same congruence closure as E. 5 The associated interpretation (the congruence closure of R Λ 1 ) now satisfies every ground instance of clause (2) . A superposition rule applied to the new context literal g(x) ≈ x and to clause (3) derives the clause
The fact that g(x) ≈ x in Λ 1 is universal guarantees that any later extensions of Λ 1 will satisfy every ground instance of the constraint literal g(x) ≈ x. This allows the simplification of (8) to the unconstrained clause
From that clause, the calculus can derive
because the current context Λ 1 satisfies every ground instance of f (x) x and of h(x) x. Since clause (10) is empty, a repair is necessary. That can be done with the addition of the parametric literal f (u) ≈ u, resulting in the new context Λ 2 = {g(x) ≈ x, f (u) ≈ u}. From this context and clause (4) it is possible to derive, in order, the clauses
Clause (12) requires another repair, for instance into the context Λ 3 = {g(x) ≈ x, f (u) ≈ u, P(v) ≈ t} with P(v) ≈ t parametric. At this point, no new clauses can be derived. Furthermore, no more repairs are needed, or in fact possible, since the latest one took care of both clause (12) and clause (5)-the latter of which was also pending. At this point the calculus stops. The E-interpretation associated to Λ 3 is the congruence closure of
This interpretation is indeed a model of the initial clause set
If the clause set also contained the clause C = P(x) t, say, the context Λ 3 would not only still fail to satisfy the clause set, for falsifying C; it would also be unrepairable with respect to C. In that case, the addition of P(v) t to Λ 2 instead of P(v) ≈ t would have to be considered, leading then to a repair with Q(v) ≈ t from clause (12) .
Because of the splitting rules the ME E calculus formally generates derivation trees. What we described in the example above is essentially one branch of a derivation tree for the given clause set that ends with a model. As discussed in that example, some derivation tree branches may end with a context that still falsifies some input clause but is unrepairable. The generation of a closed tree, a tree all of whose branches end with an unrepairable context, is a proof that the initial clause set is unsatisfiable in first-order logic with equality. This makes the ME E calculus refutationally sound for that logic. The calculus is also refutationally complete, that is, guaranteed to generate a closed derivation tree starting from any unsatisfiable clause set when used with a fair derivation strategy. As expected, ME E is not terminating for all input clause sets. Specifically, for a satisfiable clause set it can generate a derivation tree all of whose nonclosed branches need infinitely-many repairs to produce a model. However, similarly to ME, it is terminating for input sets that are clause forms of sets of ∃ * ∀ * -formulas with equality, a well known decidable fragment of first-order logic [11, 30] .
Formal Preliminaries
Most of the notions and notation we use in this paper are the standard ones in the field (see, e.g., [32] ). We report here only notable differences and additions.
Terms and Substitutions
We will use two disjoint, infinite sets of variables: a set X of universal variables, which we will refer to just as variables, and another set V, which we will always refer to as parameters. We will use u and v to denote elements of V and x and y to denote elements of X. We fix a signature Σ throughout the paper and denote by Σ sko the expansion of Σ obtained by adding to Σ an infinite number of fresh (Skolem) constants. We will consider Σ-terms and Σ sko -terms. Normally, however, we will explicitly specify their signature only when the distinction is important and not clear from context. If t is a term we denote by Var(t) the set of t's variables and by Par(t) the set of t's parameters. A term t is parameter-free iff Par(t) = ∅, it is variable-free iff Var(t) = ∅, and it is ground iff Var(t) = Par(t) = ∅. A substitution ρ is a renaming on W ⊆ (V ∪ X) iff its restriction to W is a bijection of W onto itself; ρ is simply a renaming if it is a renaming on V ∪ X. A substitution σ is p-preserving (short for parameter preserving) if it is a renaming on V. If s and t are two terms, we write s t, iff there is a substitution σ such that sσ = t. 6 We say that s is a variant of t, and write s ∼ t, iff s t and t s or, equivalently, iff there is a renaming ρ such that sρ = t. We write s t if s t but s t. We write s ≥ t and say that t is a p-instance of s iff there is a p-preserving substitution σ such that sσ = t. We say that s is a p-variant of t, and write s t, iff s ≥ t and t ≥ s; equivalently, iff there is a p-preserving renaming ρ such that sρ = t. The expression s[t] p denotes, as usual, the term obtained from term s by replacing the subterm of s at position p by term t.
Clauses
Essentially without loss of generality, we assume that Σ contains only one predicate symbol, ≈ (equality) although it may contain a finite set of function symbols of given arity; 0-ary function symbols are called constants.
Because equality is the only predicate symbol, an atom is always a (positive) equation s ≈ t, where s and t are terms, which is identified with the multiset {s, t}. Consequently, the equations s ≈ t and t ≈ s are the same. A literal is an atom, a positive literal, or the negation of an atom, a negative literal. Negative literals are generally written s t instead of ¬(s ≈ t).
We call a literal universal iff it is parameter-free. In particular, ground literals are universal. Non-universal, or parametric, literals then contain at least one parameter.
In the examples below we often write non-equational literals like P(t 1 , . . . , t n ) as an abbreviation for the equational literal P(t 1 , . . . , t n ) ≈ t, where t is a distinguished constant. We denote literals by the letters K and L. We write L to denote the complement of a literal L, i.e. A = ¬A and ¬A = A, for any atom A. By L sko we denote the result of replacing each variable of L by a fresh Skolem constant in Σ sko \ Σ. We denote clauses by the letters C and D, and the empty clause by .
A clause is a parameter-free multiset of Σ-literals
We write L ∨ C to denote the clause {L} ∪ C. The empty clause is written as .
All the notions on substitutions above are extended from terms to atoms, literals and clauses in the obvious way.
Orderings and Rewrite Systems
A reduction ordering is a well-founded partial ordering on terms that is closed under context, i.e., s s implies t[s] p t[s ] p for all terms t and positions p, and liftable, i.e., s t implies sσ tσ for every substitution σ.
We will suppose as given a reduction ordering that is total on ground Σ-terms and that the constant t is the smallest ground term in this ordering. As usual, we will use to denote the reflexive closure of .
A (rewrite) rule is an expression of the form l → r where l and r are Σ-terms. A rewrite system is a set of rewrite rules. We say that a rewrite system R is ordered by iff l r, for every rule l → r ∈ R. We will consider only ground rewrite systems ordered by . A term t is reducible by l → r iff t = t[l] p for some position p, and t is reducible wrt. R if it is reducible by some rule in R. Irreducible means "not reducible". A rewrite system R is left-reduced (fully reduced) iff for every rule l → r ∈ R, l is (l and r are) irreducible wrt R \ {l → r}. In other words, in a fully reduced rewrite system no rule is reducible by another rule, neither its left hand side nor its right hand side. A rewrite system is convergent iff it is confluent and terminating.
Interpretations
A (Herbrand) interpretation I is a set of ground Σ-atoms-those meant to be true in the interpretation. Satisfiability of first-order formulas in a Herbrand interpretation is defined as usual. In particular, if F is a literal, a clause or a clause (set), we say that I satisfies F, or is a model of F, and write I | = F, if I satisfies every ground instance of (every element of) F. An E-interpretation is an interpretation that is also a congruence relation on the ground terms. We say that F is E-(un)satisfiable if it is satisfied by (no) E-interpretations. We say that F E-entails F , written F | = E F , iff every Einterpretation that satisfies F also satisfies F . Since this is the only notion of entailment considered in the paper, we will often write just F | = F . If I is an interpretation, we denote by I the congruence closure of I, i.e., the smallest congruence relation on all ground terms that includes I, which is an E-interpretation. The above notions are applied to ground rewrite systems instead of interpretations by considering their rewrite rules as equations. For instance, we write R | = F and mean {l ≈ r | l → r ∈ R} | = F. It is well-known that every left-reduced (and hence also every fully reduced) ordered rewrite system R is convergent and that any ground equation s ≈ t is E-satisfied by R (i.e., R | = s ≈ t) if and only if s and t have the same (unique) normal form wrt. R [1].
Contexts
The Model Evolution calculus as presented in [7] works with sequents of the form Λ Φ, where Λ is a finite set of Σ sko -literals possibly with variables or with parameters, called a context, and Φ is a finite set of Σ-clauses possibly with variables. As in [7] , we will consider for simplicity only contexts whose literals do not contains both parameters and variables. 7 In [8] a context Λ consisted of equational literals, and we treated Λ as if it contained the symmetric versions of each of its equations, negated or not. We depart from that by working with rewrite literals now, which is simpler and more practical. More formally, when l and r are terms, a rewrite literal is an expression of the form l → r or its negation ¬(l → r), the latter generally written as l r. By treating → as a predicate symbol, all operations defined on equational literals apply to rewrite literals as well. For instance, l → r = l → r and l r = l → r. If clear from the context, we use the term "literal" to refer to equational literals as introduced earlier or to rewrite literals. Definition 4.1 A context is a set of the form {¬v} ∪ S where v ∈ V and S is a finite set of Σ sko -rewrite literals, each of which is parameter-free or variable-free.
For brevity, we will omit writing the pseudo-literal ¬v in examples of contexts. Notice that rewrite literals are built over the extended signature, Σ sko . As will become clear below, in the contexts constructed by the ME E calculus, Skolem constants appear only in ground rewrite literals. Also, context literals are the only place where Skolem constants can appear.
Where L is a literal and
A literal L is contradictory with a context Λ iff Lσ = Kσ for some K ∈ Λ and some p-preserving substitution σ. A context Λ is contradictory iff it contains a literal that is contradictory with Λ.
a and f (a) → a are contradictory with Λ while f (a) a and a → f (a) are not.
We will work only with non-contradictory contexts. Thanks to the next two notions, such contexts can be used as finite denotations of (certain) Herbrand interpretations. Definition 4.3 (Productivity [7] ) Let L be a rewrite literal and
For instance, the context Λ in Example 4.2 produces f (a) b, as per ¬v ∈ Λ, and Λ produces f (b) → a but it does not produce f (a) → a. Instead Λ produces f (a) a as per f (a) a ∈ ≥ Λ. It is not difficult to see that all literals produced by a parameter-free literal K in a context Λ are also strongly produced by K in Λ.
Constrained Clauses
A constraint is a finite multiset of pairs Γ = {K 1 K 1 , . . . , K m K m }, where m ≥ 0 and for i = 1, . . . , m, K i is a Σ-rewrite literal, and K i is a parameter-free Σ-rewrite literal with the same sign, but is not of the form x → t, where x is a variable and t is a term. We will consider only constraints where each K i is taken from a context Λ, and we call K i a context literal (of Γ) and K i a constraint literal (of Γ). Intuitively, a pair K i K i is satisfied if K i produces K i in Λ, among other properties, as explained below. For economy of notation we let Γ stand also for the multiset of its constraint literals (only), and thus leave the context literals implicit. This allows us to write, e.g., l → r ∈ Γ instead of the more verbose "K l → r ∈ Γ, for some K ". Whether Γ is taken this way or not will always be clear from context. The application of a substitution σ to Γ, written as Γσ, means to apply σ to each constraint literal of Γ (only), i.e., Γσ = {K 1 K 1 σ, . . . , K m K m σ}. A constraint is ground iff each of its constraint literals K i is ground. A substitution γ is a grounding substitution for Γ iff Γγ is ground.
Let C = L 1 ∨ · · · ∨ L n be a Σ-clause and Γ a constraint. The expression C · Γ is called a constrained clause (with constraint Γ). With the convention explained above, and generally leaving away the set braces, we often write
The application of a substitution σ to C·Γ, written as (C·Γ)σ, yields the constrained clause (Cσ · Γσ). A constrained clause C · Γ is ground iff both C and Γ are ground. 8 In [7] condition (i) is replaced by the stronger condition "K is an msg of L in Λ", where K is a most specific generalization (msg) of L in Λ iff K L and there is no K ∈ Λ such that K K L. Working with K L alone is somewhat simpler and achieves the same for all purposes.
When C · Γ is a constrained clause and γ is a (grounding) substitution whose range consists of ground Σ-terms, we call the pair (C · Γ, γ) a ground closure (of C · Γ), or just closure (of C · Γ). For a set of constrained clauses Φ, Φ gr denotes the set of all ground closures of all constrained clauses in Φ.
Constraint clauses are compared by associating to every constraint clause C · Γ the multiset of multisets terms
and then using the two-fold multiset extension of the term ordering on the associated multisets. Again we use the symbol to denote this (strict) ordering on constrained clauses. It follows from well-known results (see, e.g., [32] ) that is a well-founded ordering and is total on ground constrained clauses.
For instance, if a b then
All inference rules on constraint clauses defined in Section 5.1 are order-decreasing at the ground level. While different orderings exist that also satisfy this property, the particular definition above also enables a certain redundancy concept based on reducible constraints, explained below.
To obtain a total and well-founded ordering on ground closures, we combine the ordering on constrained clauses lexicographically with an arbitrary ordering on ground closures that is total (up to variable renaming), 9 that is, we define (
To reason about the soundness of the ME E calculus it is enough to treat each constrained clause
r k+1 , . . . , l n r n as the ordinary clause
From a completeness perspective, however, a different reading of constrained clauses is appropriate. The clause part C of a (ground) constrained clause C · Γ is evaluated in an E-interpretation I, whereas the literals in Γ are evaluated wrt. a context Λ in terms of productivity. The definitions below make this precise. A ground constraint Γ is ordered (wrt. ) iff l r for every l → r ∈ Γ and every l r ∈ Γ.
Definition 5.1 (Satisfaction of Constraints) Let Λ be a context, Γ a constraint and γ a grounding substitution for Γ. We say that Λ satisfies the pair (Γ, γ), and write
Γγ is ordered, and (ii) for every K K ∈ Γ, K produces both K and Kγ in Λ.
We say that Γ is satisfiable in Λ, or that Λ satisfies Γ, written as
Definition 5.2 (Satisfaction of Constrained Clauses) Let Λ be a context, I an E-interpretation, and (C · Γ, γ) a ground closure. We say that the pair (Λ, I) satisfies (C · Γ, γ) and write (Λ,
The pair (Λ, I) satisfies a possibly non-ground constrained clause (set) F, written as (Λ, I) | = F iff (Λ, I) satisfies all ground closures of (all elements in) F. For a set of constrained clauses Φ and C · Γ a (possibly non-ground) constrained clause, we say that Φ entails C · Γ, and write
The definitions above also apply to pairs (Λ, R), where R is a rewrite system, by implicitly taking (Λ, R ). In the main applications of Definition 5.2 such a rewrite system R will be determined by the model construction in Section 6.2 below.
Notice that Γγ a , Γγ b and Γγ c are ordered. Then, Λ | = (Γ, γ a ), as f (x) → x produces both f (x) → x and { f (a) → a} in Λ, and so we need to check
Inference Rules on Constrained Clauses
In the following, we introduce a number of superposition-style inference rules on rewrite literals and constrained clauses that will be used for defining the derivation rules of ME E . The inference rules assume a selection function that maps a constraint clause C · Γ with non-empty C to a subset of the literals in C, the selected literals (in C · Γ).
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where (i) σ is a most general unifier (mgu) of s and t, (ii) s t is selected in s t∨C ·Γ, and (iii) Γσ is ordered.
The next three rules combine a rewrite literal and a constrained clause. Within the ME E calculus, which operates on sequents consisting of a context and constrained clause set, the rewrite literal will come from the current context and the clause from the current constrained clause set.
Recall that substitutions are not applied to a constraint's context literals. The conclusion of the above inference rule could equally be written as (
The rules Sup-Pos and Sup-Neg are the only ones that create new positive rewrite literals (l → r)σ in the constraint part. It is possible that in both cases the left premise is of the form x → t (x → t might stem from a clause literal x ≈ t), but because l is not a variable, lσ is not a variable either. Thus, adding to Γσ the rewrite literal (l → r)σ preserves the property of being a constraint, as constraints must not contain rewrite literals of the form x → t. As an easy inductive consequence all expressions C · Γ derivable by the calculus are indeed constrained clauses.
Neg-Res
where (i) ¬A is the pseudo literal ¬v or a negative Σ-rewrite literal l r, (ii) σ is a mgu of A and s → t, (iii) tσ sσ, (iv) s ≈ t is selected in s ≈ t ∨ C · Γ, and (v) Γσ is ordered.
In the Sup-Neg, Sup-Pos and Neg-Res rules we implicitly assume that the conclusion is parameter-free. That can always be achieved by renaming parameters in the conclusion to fresh variables or by taking parameter-free variants of the left premise. We also assume that the two premises are variable-disjoint, which can always be achieved by taking a fresh variant of the, say, right premise.
Observe that due to the condition (i) stated with Sup-Neg, Sup-Pos and NegRes, the left premise cannot contain Skolem constants. Rewrite literals with Skolem constants are considered only by the Close derivation rule of ME E (defined in the next section).
An inference system ι is a set of inference rules. By an ι-inference we mean an instance of an inference rule from ι such that the conditions stated with that rule are satisfied. An inference is ground if all its premises and the conclusion are ground.
The base inference systems ι Base consists of Ref, Sup-Neg, Sup-Pos and NegRes. If from a given ι Base -inference a ground ι Base -inference results by applying a substitution γ to all premises and the conclusion, we call the resulting ground inference a ground instance via γ (of the ι Base -inference). This is not always the case, as, e.g., ordering constraints can become unsatisfiable after application of γ.
An important consequence of the ordering restrictions for the inference rules is that the conclusion of a ground ι Base inference is always strictly smaller than the right or only premise.
The ME E Calculus
In this section we describe the ME E calculus, starting with its basic derivation rules. Then we define a model construction mechanism that will allow us to associate with each context a convergent rewrite system. On top of that, we then define concepts of redundancy and relevance, which together are the main tools to explain the calculus' completeness. Finally, we introduce certain optional derivation rules, which are important for practical efficiency.
Basic Derivation Rules
We now introduce the basic set of derivation rules that define the ME E calculus. The rules of operate on sequents, pair of the form Λ Φ where Λ is a context and Φ is a set of constrained clauses. In the rules, we use the notation Λ, K Φ, C as an abbreviation of Λ ∪ {K} Φ ∪ {C}.
The first rule of the calculus extends the inference rules ι Base from Section 5.1 to sequents.
if one of the following cases applies:
• C · Γ is the conclusion of a Ref inference with a premise from Φ.
• C ·Γ is the conclusion of a Sup-Neg, Sup-Pos or Neg-Res inference with a right premise from Φ and a left premise K ∈ Λ that produces Kσ in Λ, where σ is the mgu used in that inference.
The (pseudo) literal K is the selected rewrite literal (of a Deduce inference).
In all cases above, the right (or only) premise of the ι Base inference rules applied by Deduce is called the selected clause.
We will later formulate restrictions that allow proof procedures for the calculus to disregard certain Deduce inferences based on suitable notions of (completenesspreserving) redundancy.
The next rule, Split, has two alternative conclusions respectively extending the current context with a literal or its complement. It comes in two variants, depending on whether the chosen literal satisfies a certain variable-disjointness condition or not.
, and (ii) neither K nor K sko is contradictory with Λ. The literal K is the split literal (of the U-Split inference).
Because constraints are parameter-free, the literal K is parameter-free, too. Intuitively, K can be understood as a (universally quantified) unit clause. For instance, U-Split applied to · ¬v ¬P(x, a), ¬v ¬Q(y) and Λ = ∅ gives {P(x, a)} (left context) and {¬P(c, a)} (right context), where c is a fresh Skolem constant. Observe that U-Split no longer applies with the same literal, neither to the left-hand nor to the right-hand conclusion.
The literal L is the split literal (of the P-Split inference).
For instance, P-Split applied to · ¬v ¬P(x, a), ¬v ¬Q(x) and Λ = ∅ gives {P(v, a)} (left context) and {¬P(v, a)} (right context). Observe that P-Split no longer applies with the same literal, neither to the left-hand nor to the right-hand conclusion.
We will refer to either of the two rules above as a a Split rule and call the clause · K, Γ the selected clause (of the Split-inference). The intuition behind Split is to make a constrained empty clause · Γ true, which is false when Λ satisfies Γ (in the sense of Definition 5.2). This is achieved by adding K to the current context. For example, if Λ = {P(a, v), ¬P(u, b)} and · Γ = · P(a, b) then a P-Split-inference will give {P(a, v), ¬P(u, b), ¬P(a, b)} in the left conclusion, which no longer produces P(a, b). Intuitively, the calculus tries to "repair" the current context towards a model for a constrained empty clause. But as Λ is only an approximation of the intended interpretation, the repair mechanism will sometimes overshoot, but it will cover all relevant cases (Lemma 6.2).
Notice that a Split inference can never add an oriented literal to a context that already contains a variant of it or its complement, as this would contradict condition (ii) of U-Split and corresponding condition (iii) of U-Split.
The constrained clause · Γ is the selected clause (of the Close inference).
In terms of standard notions, the condition in the Close rule is equivalent to have that for every literal K ∈ Γ, if (a) K does not share variables with other literals in Γ then K can be instantiated to a parametric context literal in Λ or K is unifiable with a (fresh variant of a) universal literal in Λ, or else (b) K is a variant of a parametric context literal in Λ or K is an instance of a universal literal in Λ.
The ME E calculus consists of the mandatory inference rules Deduce, U-Split, PSplit and Close. By an ME E inference we mean an instance of any of these inference rules. Below we will add optional inference rules to the ME E calculus.
Model Construction
In essence, a basic proof procedure for the ME E calculus starts from a sequent Λ 0 Φ 0 containing an empty context and a set of constrained clauses with empty constraints, and generates a derivation tree using the rules in Section 6.1, with the goal of finding an E-interpretation that satisfies the initial clause set or verifying in the process that no such interpretation exists. Each sequent Λ Φ in the derivation tree has an associated a candidate model for the initial clause set Φ 0 . This is the Einterpretation induced by a convergent ground rewrite system R Λ extracted from Λ.
In this section, we show how R Λ is defined and discuss it main properties, which will be useful both in defining a powerful notion of redundancy for ME E and in proving its completeness. 12 The general technique for defining R Λ is borrowed from the completeness proof of the Superposition calculus [2, 25] , but adapted to our needs. One difference is that ME E requires the construction of a fully reduced rewrite system, whereas for Superposition a left-reduced rewrite system is sufficient.
Let Λ be a non-contradictory context. By identifying a rewrite rule l → r with the multiset {l, r} and using the multiset extension of the term ordering , again denoted by itself, we define by well-founded induction, and with respect to Λ, sets of ground Σ-rewrite rules K and R K , for every ground Σ-rewrite rule K. Assume that L has already been defined for all such L with K L and let R K = K L L . Then, K is generally defined as follows.
{l → r} if Λ produces l → r, l r, and l and r are irreducible wrt. R l→r ∅ otherwise
When l→r = {l → r}, we say that Λ generates l → r. Finally, the rewrite system associated with Λ is the set R Λ = l→r l→r .
With a b c the associated rewrite system R Λ is {b → c}. To see why, observe that the candidate rule a → c is not included in R Λ , as Λ does not produce a → c, and that the other candidate a → b, although produced in Λ, is reducible by the smaller rule b → c. Had we chosen to omit in the definition of l→r the condition "r is irreducible wrt. R l→r " 13 the construction would have given R Λ = {a → b, b → c}. This leads to the undesirable situation that a constrained clause, say, a c · ∅ is falsified by R Λ , the E-interpretation induced by R Λ . But the calculus cannot modify Λ to revert this situation, and to detect the inconsistency (ordered) paramodulation into variables would be needed.
It is not difficult to see that R Λ is a fully reduced rewrite system. Since is a wellfounded ordering, R Λ is convergent. It follows from standard results in term rewriting that the satisfiability of ground literals s ≈ t (or s t) in R Λ can be decided by checking if the normal forms of s and t wrt. R Λ are the same.
The following lemma establishes an important relation between ground rewrite literals produced by Λ and the rewrite system R Λ . Lemma 6.2 Let l and r be ground Σ-terms with l r.
(ii) If l and r are irreducible wrt. R Λ then Λ strongly produces l r.
The following provides a notion of satisfaction of constraints in terms of the rewrite system R Λ . Definition 6.3 (Satisfaction of Constraints wrt. Rewrite Systems) Let Γ be a ground constraint. We say that R satisfies Γ, and write R Λ | = Γ, iff (i) l → r ∈ R Λ for all l → r ∈ Γ, and (ii) l and r are irreducible wrt. R Λ for all l r ∈ Γ.
For example, if R Λ = {a → b, d → e} and a b c d e then R Λ | = {a c, d → e} because the left-hand side of a c is reducible wrt. R Λ . By combining Definition 6.3 and Lemma 6.2, we immediately conclude that Λ produces every rewrite literal in a ground constraint Γ if R Λ | = Γ. The relevance of this result is that, whenever Γ is satisfied by R Λ then the "syntactic" notion of productivity can be used to identify such situations, in particular to identify (certain) constrained clauses C · Γ that are falsified by (Λ, R Λ ).
Relevance and Redundancy
The calculus attempts to constructs a model of the initial clause set by deriving, possibly in the limit, a saturated sequent Λ Φ where R Λ satisfies all ordinary clauses in Φ, i.e., R Λ | = {C | C · ∅}, unless Φ contains the empty constrained clause with empty constraint, · ∅. Note that the saturated sequent is not such that (Λ, R Λ ) | = Φ. Intuitively, the evaluation of constraints according to Definition 5.1 is too strong to obtain (Λ, R Λ ) | = Φ in general: given a saturated sequent Λ Φ and a ground closure (C · Γ, γ) for some C · Γ ∈ Φ we might have Λ | = (Γ, γ) but R Λ | = Cγ, and the calculus cannot detect this situation (see the statement of Theorem 6.10 for an example). To fix the problem, we introduce a weaker notion of satisfaction of constraints in terms of rewrite systems, which will render such ground closures irrelevant when applied to the intended rewrite system R Λ . Definition 6.4 (Relevant Closure wrt. Λ) Let Λ be a context and (C · Γ, γ) a ground closure. We say that (C · Γ, γ) is a relevant (ground) closure wrt. Λ iff
Note that, by definition, all ground closures of a clause with an empty constraint are relevant. Also note that for C · Γ to have relevant closures it does not have to belong to a specific clause set. Indeed, conclusions of inference rules may well have relevant closures even if they are not included in the current clause set, for instance because the inference is redundant (see below).
then the substitution γ = {x → a} gives a ground closure (C · Γ, γ) that satisfies condition (i) but not (ii). With the substitution γ = {x → c} both (i) and (ii) are satisfied, and with γ = {x → b} the condition (i) is not satisfied but (ii) is. If Λ = {P(a)} then (( · P(a) P(x)), γ) is never a relevant closure, for no γ, because P(a) does not produce P(x) in Λ. Indeed, in particular, Close cannot be applied to, say, {P(a)} · P(a) P(x), but there is no need to anyway. The calculus does not need to consider such "irrelevant" closures to be complete. 
is a relevant closure wrt. Λ}, and
In words, Φ Λ D is the set of relevant closures wrt. Λ of all constrained clauses from Φ that are all smaller wrt. than D.
From a completeness perspective it is sufficient to work with a sufficiently developed context Λ and check that all relevant closures wrt. Λ are satisfied by the pair (Λ, R Λ ). It would be useful to declare clauses as redundant if they are not satisfied by (Λ, R Λ ) (or not relevant wrt. Λ). However, this would be difficult to exploit in practice, as the rewrite system R Λ would have to be taken into account. Unfortunately, R Λ may change as Λ is modified. The following definition provides a more practical redundancy criterion.
We say that a ground constraint Γ is reducible by a ground rule l → r iff one of the following two cases applies:
(i) there is a s → t ∈ Γ with s → t l → r such that s or t is reducible by l → r, or (ii) there is a s t ∈ Γ such that s or t is reducible by l → r.
It is not difficult to see that a ground closure (C · Γ, γ) cannot be a relevant closure wrt. Λ if the constraint Γγ is reducible by a rule in R Λ . This fact is exploited to justify a specific case of redundancy, the second part in item (iii) in the following definition. 
We say that (C · Γ, γ) is redundant wrt. Λ Φ, iff (C · Γ, γ) is redundant wrt. Λ Φ and (C · Γ, γ), and we say that C · Γ is redundant wrt. Λ Φ iff every ground closure
Intuitively, condition (i) ensures that if the given closure (C · Γ, γ) is relevant then each ground closure (Γ i · C i , γ i ) used to establish the redundancy is relevant, too. Condition (ii) makes sure that only ground closures smaller than the given closure D are used. Condition (iii) then adds sufficient conditions so that satisfaction in terms of Definition 5.1 is preserved or that (C · Γ, γ) is irrelevant because Γγ is not satisfied by R Λ . As an example for the latter case assume a b c. By definition of the ordering on constrained clauses we have
Therefore, the clause · a → b is redundant in presence of b ≈ c · ∅, and · f (a) → c is redundant in presence of a ≈ b · ∅.
Referring to the notion of derivation trees formally defined in Section 7 below, it can be shown that a constrained clause that is redundant at some node of the derivation tree will remain redundant in all successor nodes. Consequently, a redundant clause can be deleted from a clause set without endangering refutational completeness.
A practically useful case of redundancy is when Λ | = ∃ Γ holds, say, because Γ contains an element K K such that K Λ or K does not produce K in Λ, as then C · Γ is redundant wrt. Λ Φ, for every C and Φ.
Another useful case is when a constraint literal can be demodulated by an orientable positive unit clause, which justifies to delete its constraint clause. For instance C · Γ, P( f (a)), can be deleted in presence of f (x) ≈ x · . 14 Any constrained clause C ·L, Γ is redundant wrt. every Λ Φ such that C ·Γ ∈ Φ. If L ∈ ≥ Λ then the clausal form of C ·Γ is a consequence of the clausal form of C ·L, Γ, and the Simp rule below then can be used to simplify C·L, Γ to C·Γ. Dually, if L ∈ ≥ Λ then L cannot be produced in Λ, it follows Λ | = ∃ L, Γ and so C · L, Γ is redundant wrt. Λ Φ, for every C and Φ. These considerations show that ME E generalizes corresponding simplification rules by unit clauses in the propositional DPLL-procedure.
Also, a constrained clause C · Γ is redundant wrt. any sequent containing a constrained clause C · Γ such that Γ ⊂ Γ . This can be exploited to finitely bound the number of derivable constrained clauses, for instance, if the term depth is limited. In other words, ME E can be used as a decision procedure for Bernays-Schönfinkel formulas with equality.
Proposition 6.8 Let Λ Φ be a sequent and (C · Γ, γ) a ground closure. If (i) C · Γ is redundant wrt. Λ Φ, (ii) (C · Γ, γ) is a relevant ground closure wrt. Λ, and (iii) , γ) . Proposition 6.8 establishes a relationship between redundant clauses and satisfaction by (Λ, R Λ ). It is used in the completeness proof, which is based on an inductive argument that allows to assume that all relevant closures wrt. Λ that are smaller wrt. than a hypothetically falsified closure (C · Γ, γ) are all satisfied by (Λ, R Λ ). Proposition 6.8 then allows to conclude that (C · Γ, γ) is satisfied by (Λ, R Λ ), and hence cannot be that hypothetically falsified clause.
Definition 6.9 (Redundant ME E Inference) Let Λ Φ and Λ Φ be sequents. An ME E inference with premise Λ Φ and selected clause C · Γ ∈ Φ is redundant wrt. Λ Φ iff every ground closure (C · Γ, γ) of C · Γ is redundant wrt. Λ Φ , or the following holds, depending on the inference rule applied:
Deduce: applying γ to all premises and the conclusion C · Γ of the underlying ι Base inference does not result in a ground instance via γ of this ι Base inference, or (C · Γ , γ) is redundant wrt. Λ Φ and (C · Γ)γ.
Split: C · Γ = · Γ and there is a literal K ∈ Γ such that Λ does not produce K, or the split literal of the inference is contradictory with Λ .
It is not too difficult to see that actually carrying out an inference renders it redundant wrt. the resulting sequent(s). For Split, in particular, the condition "there is a literal K ∈ Γ such that Λ does not produce K" achieves that for the left sequent in the conclusion, by means of adding the Split literal to Λ; and the condition "the split literal of the inference is contradictory with Λ " achieves that for the right sequent in the conclusion. With a view to implementation, this indicates that effective proof procedures for ME E indeed exist. Finally, a sequent Λ Φ is saturated iff every ME E inference with premise Λ Φ is redundant wrt. Λ Φ. 
We get R Λ = {a → b}. By taking γ = {x → a} observe that Λ | = (P(x) P(x), γ) but R Λ | = P(x)γ, hence (Λ, R Λ ) | = P(x) · P(x) P(x). Deriving · ¬v ¬P(x), P(x) P(x) does not help to close Λ. But notice that P(x)γ = P(a) is reducible wrt. R Λ , and so P(x) · P(x) P(x), γ is not a relevant closure wrt. Λ, and Theorem 6.10 is not violated.
Theorem 6.10 applies to a statically given sequent Λ Φ. The connection to the dynamic derivation process of the ME E calculus will be given later, and Theorem 6.10 will be essential then in proving the completeness of the ME E calculus.
Optional Derivation Rules
The calculus can be enhanced with a few optional and rather general derivation rules. Suitable specializations of these rules are useful in producing efficient implementations of ME E . Some of these rules refer to the clausal form of a constrained clause
r k+1 , . . . , l n r n , defined as the ordinary clause C ∨ l 1 r i ∨ · · · ∨ l k r k ∨ l k+1 ≈ r k+1 ∨ · · · ∨ l n ≈ r n and denoted by (C · Γ) c -note that the constraint's context literals are ignored in the clausal form. We define the clausal form of a set Φ = {C i · Γ i } i of constrained claused as the set
For the rest of the paper we fix a constant a from the signature Σ sko \ Σ and the substitution α := {v → a | v ∈ V} that maps each parameter to a. 15 For each literal L, we denote by L a the literal Lα. Note that L a is ground if, and only if, L is variable-free. For each context Λ we will consider the set
r ∈ Λ} and treat it as a set of unit clauses.
The first optional derivation rule, Compact simplifies a context by removing a superfluous literal.
The Compact rule is the only rule that can remove literals from a context. It is easy to see that any literal produced by L in Λ is also produced by L in Λ, provided Λ is non-contradictory. Notice that L must be a universal literal, otherwise Λ ∪ {L} would contain two variants of the same (parametric) literal, which is impossible by construction of Λ ∪ {L}. This means that it is possible, although not mandatory, to remove with each Compact inference all occurrences of L in the constraints in the clauses in Φ. See the discussion under Simplification by Context Literals further below for the justification.
Like DPLL, the ME calculus includes an optional derivation rule, called Assert, to insert a literal into a context without causing branching. In ME this rule bears close resemblance to the unit-resulting resolution rule. Here we propose the rather general rule Assert rule, defined below.
L is non-contradictory with Λ, and (iii) there is no K ∈ Λ such that K ≥ L.
As an example, Assert is applicable to the sequent ¬v, P(u, b), b ≈ c P(x, y) ∨ f (x) ≈ y to yield the new context equation f (u) ≈ c.
The third condition of Assert avoids the introduction of superfluous literals in the context. The first condition is needed for soundness. This condition is not decidable in its full generality and so can only be approximated with an incomplete test. This, however, is not a problem given that Assert is optional.
To make derivation in ME E practical the redundancy criteria defined in Subsection 6.3 should be made available not only to avoid redundant inferences, but also to simplify constrained clauses or delete redundant clauses. Instead of attempting to define individual derivation rules covering specific situations we provide a generic simplification rule Simp and discuss some of its instantiations.
Trivial Equations. Any constrained clause C · Γ of the form s ≈ s ∨ D · Γ can be simplified to t ≈ t · ∅. Such a simplification step has the same effect as if C · Γ were deleted. Dually, any constrained clause C · Γ of the form s s ∨ D · Γ can be simplified to D · Γ.
Proper Subsumption. The Simp rule also enables deletion of a constrained clause that is properly subsumed by another one. More formally, we say that C · Γ properly subsumes C · Γ iff there is a substitution σ such that C σ ⊂ C and Γ σ ⊆ Γ, or C σ ⊆ C and Γ σ ⊂ Γ.
Simplification by Context Literals. Another practically relevant application of Simp corresponds to applications of the unit resolution rule, both into the clause part and into the constraint part of a constrained clause. Regarding the former, suppose a context Λ, K Φ, C ∨ L · Γ where K is a universal rewrite literal, taken as an equational literal, and suppose there is a mgu of K and L such that (C · Γ)σ = C · Γ. Because K is parameter-free it follows that (Λ ∪ {K})
In an earlier example we applied U-Split to ∅ · ¬P(x, a), ¬Q(y) and obtained the left sequent P(x, a) · ¬P(x, a), ¬Q(y) and the right sequent ¬P(c, a) · ¬P(x, a), ¬Q(y), where c is a fresh Skolem constant. The constrained clause in the left sequent can be deleted, and the constrained clause in the right sequent can be simplified to ¬P(c, a) · ¬Q(y). Observe that such simplifications of conclusions of U-Split inferences are always possible. More precisely, in a sequent Λ, K Φ, (C · Γ, L), where K is a universal rewrite literal, the constrained clause C · Γ, L can be simplified to (C · Γ)σ when σ is an mgu of K and L and (C · Γ)σ = C · Γ. Dually, if there is a mgu of K and
Even parametric context literals can be used for certain simplifications: in a sequent Λ φ a clause of the form C · Γ, K L ∈ Φ can be deleted from Φ in particular if there is a (possibly parametric) literal K ∈ Λ such that K K L. Observe that this situation always comes up in the left context after a P-Split application. Consequently, in the left context the clause can again be deleted. However, in the right context the clause cannot be simplified as for U-Split above, such a simplification step would not be justified. For example, · P(x), Q(x) cannot be simplified by means of a context literal P(u) to · Q(x) (by U-Split then ¬Q(x) could be added to the context, which is clearly not sound).
The applications of Simp above have an explicit counterpart in ME and (on the propositional logic level) in DPLL, the Resolve and the Subsume rules. In other words, Simp covers-and generalizes-these rules.
Demodulation with Unit Constrained Clauses and Context Literals. A constrained clause comprised of an orientable positive unit clause and an empty constraint, i.e., a constrained clause of the form l ≈ r · ∅ with l r, can be used to simplify by demodulation the clause part of a constrained clause. For instance, if
a · f (y) → a are among the current constrained clauses, then the latter can be simplified by two-fold demodulation with the former to obtain y ≈ g(y) ∨ a a · f (y) → a.
On the other hand, even when orientable and parameter-free, (positive) rewrite literals from a context cannot be used for demodulation. If that is desired and if the current context contains such a parameter-free literal l → r one can always add the corresponding unit clause l ≈ r · ∅ to the current constrained clause set and use that one for demodulation, as indicated above. This is indeed sound, as one can imagine applying a (sound) Split-like inference where l ≈ r · ∅ is added to the clause set in the left-hand sequent and its Skolemized negation (l r) sko · ∅ is added to the clause set in the right-hand sequent to which Close is then applicable.
From now on, we will consider the inference rules Simp, Assert and Compact part of the ME E calculus.
Correctness of the ME E Calculus
In this section we show that the ME E calculus builds for a given clause set a derivation tree over sequents all of whose branches end in a closed sequent iff the clause set is unsatisfiable. Formally, we consider ordered trees T = (N, E) where N and E are the sets of nodes and edges of T, respectively, and the nodes N are labeled with sequents. We will often identify a tree's node with its label. Also, we will use κ to denote any ordinal up to and including the first infinite one.
Derivation trees T (of a set {C 1 , . . . , C n } of Σ-clauses) are defined inductively as follows: an initial tree, a single-node tree with a root of the form ¬v C 1 ·∅, . . . , C n ·∅, is a derivation tree; if T is a derivation tree, N is a leaf node of T and T is a tree obtained from T by adding one or two child nodes to N so that N is the premise of an inference and the child node(s) is (are) its conclusion(s), then T is derivation tree.
In this case we say that T is derived from T. A refutation tree is a derivation tree all of whose leaves have a clause set containing the clause · ∅. A derivation (of {C 1 , . . . , C n }) is a possibly infinite sequence of derivation trees that starts with an initial tree and continues with trees each of which is derived from its immediate predecessor. Each derivation D = (N i , E i ) i<κ for some κ determines a limit tree ( i<κ N i , i<κ E i ). Note that a limit tree is indeed a tree but is not a derivation tree unless it is finite-in which case it coincides with the last tree in the derivation. Now let T be the limit tree of some derivation, let B = (N i ) i<κ be a branch in T with κ nodes, and let Λ i Φ i be the sequent labeling node N i , for all i < κ. Define Λ B = i<κ i≤ j<κ Λ j and Φ B = i<κ i≤ j<κ Φ j , the sets of persistent context literals and persistent clauses, respectively. These two sets can be combined to obtain the limit sequent Λ B Φ B (of T). The limit rewrite system is the rewrite system R Λ B , written as R B for convenience.
Soundness
To show that the ME E calculus is sound we use an adaptation of the notion of asatisfiability from [9] to the equational case. A sequent Λ Φ is a-(un)satisfiable iff the clause set Λ a ∪ Φ c is E-(un)satisfiable. The idea behind the soundness proof is to replace, conceptually, in a refutation tree every parameter in every context literal by the same constant a, and then treat context literals as unit clauses and constrained clauses as ordinary clauses by considering their clause form. This results in a refutation tree where all splits are over complementary unit clauses and all inferences are sound in the standard sense. More formally, the soundness proof relies on the fact that the derivation rules of the calculus preserve a-satisfiability, as made precise in the following lemma.
Lemma 7.1 For every application of an ME E derivation rule, if the sequent in the premise is a-satisfiable, so is one of the sequents in the conclusion.
Proposition 7.2 (Soundness)
For all sets Ψ of Σ-clauses, if Ψ has a refutation tree then Ψ is E-unsatisfiable.
Completeness
As usual, the completeness of ME E relies on a suitable notion of fairness, which is defined in terms of exhausted branches. Recall that we distinguish between the mandatory derivation rules, which are Deduce, U-Split, P-Split and Close, and the optional ones, Assert, Simp and Compact. Definition 7.3 (Exhausted Branch) Let T be a limit tree and B = (N i ) i<κ a branch in T with κ nodes. For all i < κ, let Λ i Φ i be the sequent labeling node N i . The branch B is exhausted iff (i) for all i < κ, every ME E inference with a mandatory derivation rule with premise Λ i Φ i and persistent selected rewrite literal, if any, and persistent selected clause is redundant wrt. Λ j Φ j , for some j < κ with j ≥ i, and (ii) · ∅ Φ B .
A limit tree of a derivation is fair iff it is a refutation tree or it has an exhausted branch. A derivation is fair iff its limit tree is fair.
Proposition 7.4 (Exhausted Branches are Saturated) If B is an exhausted branch in a limit tree of a fair derivation then Λ B Φ B is saturated.
Proposition 7.4 is instrumental in the proof of our main result, which is the following.
Theorem 7.5 (Completeness) Let Ψ be a Σ-clause set and let T be the limit tree of a fair derivation of Ψ. If T is not a refutation tree then Ψ is satisfiable; more specifically, for every exhausted branch B of T with limit sequent
Note 7.6 (Proof Procedures) Carrying out an Deduce inference makes that inference redundant wrt. the resulting sequent. Similarly, carrying out a U-Split or P-Split inference makes that inference redundant wrt. both resulting sequents. This indicates that a fair proof procedure for ME E indeed exists. (The Close rule is unproblematic.) See Section 8 for a more detailed description of the proof procedure implemented in our system.
For sets consisting of clauses only with literals of the form (¬)P(t 1 , . . . , t n ) ≈ t or (¬)(t 1 ≈ t 2 ) where each t i is either a variable or a constant, every fair derivation is finite. This is due to the following reasons: contexts cannot grow infinitely because no (non-contradictory) context can contain two p-variants of the same literal and terms cannot grow in depth. Therefore, there are only finitely many U-Split and P-Split along each branch. Constrained clauses are either shortened in their clause part, by a Ref or Neg-Res inference, or a Sup-Res or Neg-Res inference replaces a constant in the clause part by either a smaller constant or a fresh variable (recall that superposition into variables is not possible). It is easy to see that these operations cannot be repeated infinitely often along a branch. The same holds for the remaining rules. Altogether, this leads to the following decidability result: Corollary 7.7 (Bernays-Schönfinkel Class with Equality) The ME E calculus can be used as a decision procedure for the Bernays-Schönfinkel class, i.e., for sentences with the quantifier prefix ∃ * ∀ * .
Implementation
The ME E calculus has been implemented within the E-Darwin theorem prover, which is a fork from the Darwin system [6] that implements the original ME calculus. E-Darwin is intended as a testbed for equality-based reasoning in conjunction with model evolution. For this purpose E-Darwin features a number of equality-related inferences in addition to the basic ME, including those of the predecessor calculus [8] . Also, E-Darwin retains the original Darwin implementation, without equality. This enables the user to select which calculus to employ.
E-Darwin supports input in TPTP and Protein syntax. The system operates on clauses in clause normal form. Input formulas are clausified using the prover E [33] .
Results can be returned in various forms, including the SZS-compliant result status used in the CASC [27, 36] competition for automated theorem provers. For satisfiable input E-Darwin can return a model if it terminates. More precisely, recall that the EInterpretation I induced by a context is given as the rewrite system R Λ obtained from the model construction (cf. Section 6.2). In order to effectively evaluate any ground literal L in I, by taking its normal form wrt. R Λ , one needs to be able to identify all rewrite rules from R Λ that can reduce L. This can be done effectively if the ordering is such that for any ground term there are only finitely many terms that are smaller than those occurring in L. Knuth-Bendix orderings satisfy this property.
Proofs are provided in the form of listings of the derivation steps taken, with the level of detail being selectable. E-Darwin is implemented in the functional/imperative language OCaml 16 . The prover is available under the GNU General Public License at the E-Darwin website 17 . Figure 1 : Main data structures and proving loop of E-Darwin. → indicates a transfer from one processing phase or data structure into another, and ⇒ indicates participation in inferences.
Proof Procedure
E-Darwin uses a uniform strategy for all classes of problems. Three principal data structures are maintained throughout the operation: the context and the set of clauses which together form the current sequent, and the set of candidates with the latter consisting of derived clauses and candidate split literals. The latter serves as an intermediate storage for inference results, each result being either a clause or a context literal. Candidates are not used in the reasoning before they have been selected for addition to the sequent and removed from the candidate set. Fig. 1 illustrates the relation between these structures. At first the context contains only the pseudo literal ¬v, while the clause set consists of the input. The candidate set is immediately populated by the inference results of the initial context and the input, i.e. clauses derived by Neg-Res using the ¬v literal, and also new context literals derived by applying Assert to unit clauses. From then on the prover loop proceeds as follows.
In step x the heuristic selection picks one element from the candidate set. Preference is given to candidates which can close the current derivation branch. Such candidates are detected by various lookahead functions which continuously compare candidates against each other as well as against the context and the clause set. Also, the selection avoids picking candidates which are subsumed by existing clauses and context literals, and currently non-productive clauses are avoided as well. Other selection criteria include preferring universal over parametric context literals, and clauses with an empty clause part over those clauses that have both constraint and non-constraint literals. Furthermore, an iterative deepening strategy, bounded by term and clause weight, favors the lighter candidates. More importantly, it also ensures that candidates derived by the Split inferences are selected only when all other candidate subsets have been exhausted within the weight bound. This mechanism generates a fair derivation strategy.
A Split candidate is essentially a context literal K, but upon its selection a choice point will be set, allowing a backtracking of a closed derivation branch. Then the negated (and in the case of U-Split skolemized) counterpart to K will be added to the context instead, and the derivation continues with this alternative branch.
Once selected, a candidate can be used for inferencing. The first inferences applied to a clause candidate serve to reduce the clause to a minimal form. This happens in the clause reduction step labeled y. Here the context and the clause set can demodulate the candidate and remove literals in accordance with the sub-rules covered by Simp. The Ref-rule makes additional reductions. This simplification phase is iterated exhaustively until a minimal clause has been derived which renders the original candidate clause and all intermediate clauses redundant. This means that for example a candidate clause C may be simplified to C in the first iteration, which is then reduced to C in the next and final Simp-application. Only C will have to be added to the set of clauses after step y.
As backjumping is used once a branch is closed, a sequence of simplifications may become partially invalid. In the example the original candidate C may still be valid for the new derivation branch, and the simplification to C is also still possible. Yet the final reduction to C no longer works, for example because the responsible equational unit clause has been backtracked. To account for such events the clause reduction module stores the original candidate clauses and the simplifying inference partners used during the sequence. If such a partner is backtracked, then the simplification is restarted for the candidate clause.
While the goal of step y is to produce a minimal clause for the clause set, the simplification process may also result in a tautological or redundant clause. In that case the prover returns to step x for a new candidate. Another possibility is that the candidate clause gets reduced to the empty clause. This closes the branch immediately and initiates the backtracking procedure.
After the reduction the candidate is used as a premise in those inferences which derive new candidates, a step labeled z in the figure. Note that new context literals proceed to z right away after their selection in x, skipping the simplification in y. For a new clause with a non-empty clause part the derivation rules applied in step z are Sup-Neg, Sup-Pos and Neg-Res. The premise partners are taken from the context or the clause set as required. If a new clause has nothing but constraint literals, then it is subject to the Split rules as well as to Close. The optional Assert rule is applied to all selected clause candidates.
In principle these operations are accomplished by searches in discrimination tree indexes [23] over the sequent. Both imperfect and perfect indexing trees are used. The latter are an addition over the original Darwin, primarily serving to support the new superposition-based term rewriting. In practice these index searches are expensive, so E-Darwin keeps track of which pairings of context literals and clause positions unify and hence can be used as inference premises. Since terms are shared between literals and literals between clauses, this caching minimizes expensive index lookup operations, allowing a context literal to find all occurrences of a matching subterm in the set of clauses with a single index search and vice versa.
If the selected candidate is a new context literal, it first attempts to Close with any existing clause and other context literals as required, triggering the backtracking mechanism if successful. Otherwise all Sup-Neg, Sup-Pos, Neg-Res and Assert inferences are computed in conjunction with the current sequent.
Any selected candidate may be able to simplify previously derived clauses, so Simp is computed. If a clause C is determined to be simplifiable by a candidate into C , C is treated as an inference result and added to the candidate set. A redundancy mechanism then essentially deactivates C for the current sequent. Nevertheless this clause is still kept by E-Darwin, as its simplification may become invalid during backtracking. In this case the deactivation is quickly reversible, returning the original clause to the reasoning process.
All inference results passing some sanity checks are stored in the appropriate candidate set in step {. In the final step | the selected candidate is inserted into the sequent, either into the context, applying Compact in the process, or into the clause set. Then the cycle starts anew.
From the implementation perspective, the possibility to derive new clauses is a significant difference between the ME and the ME E calculus. The implementation of ME in Darwin maintains a dynamic context and candidate set, while the set of clauses remains static, as no clause is ever added beyond the input. In E-Darwin however all sets must be dynamic in order to allow the derivation of new clauses. In comparison to the basic Dawin prover most existing modules had to be modified for E-Darwin. Combined with the additions this has resulted in an increase of the code size by approximately 50%.
Experimental Evaluation
We have tested E-Darwin over those problems of the TPTP library Version 4.0.1 [35] that are given in clause normal form (CNF) or as first order formulas (FOF). Overall the test set consisted of 13783 problems, constituting 83% of the whole TPTP with 16512 problems. (The remaining 17% of TPTP consist of higher-order logic problems, which are inappropriate for most current automated theorem provers, including E-Darwin.) E-Darwin implements different selectable calculi, so for the test the prover was configured to use the ME E calculus as described in this paper. The test systems featured an Intel Q9950 quad processors at 2.83GHz. E-Darwin does not support parallelization at this point, so each problem was handled by one process utilizing one CPU core. The memory was limited to 1GB for each problem, and the maximum time allowed per problem was 300 seconds. Under these conditions E-Darwin solved 5977 problems, corresponding to 43.4% of the tested problems, or 36.2% of the full TPTP. The test set contains 3010 problems which carry a rating of 1.00, which means that no automated theorem prover solves these problems at the time of the release of the TPTP version 4.0.1. E-Darwin proves six of these problems. 18 The TPTP subset we used for our tests is commonly used for evaluating automated theorem provers for first-oder logic. The TPTP organizers periodically test theorem provers on appropriate TPTP problem sets and list the results on the TPTP website. 19 The timeout limits used in these official TPTP tests are set individually for each prover, either at 300 seconds or at 600 seconds, depending on whether the higher limit allows for a significant increase in the number of problems that this system proves. This method minimizes the time required for tests, and it is based on the observation that for any given prover the number of proofs does not increase linearly with the raising of the timeout limit, instead the bulk of proofs will be found within a certain timeframe, and additional time beyond this will only lead to minor gains regarding successful proofs. In Table 1 we quote the official TPTP results for a number of provers which have been tested on the same subset of the TPTP, and we list our own E-Darwin results for comparison. The provers in the list are Bliksem [15] , Darwin [6] , E [33] , Equinox [13] , E-KRHyper [28] , Geo [16] , iProver [20] , Metis [19] , Otter [24] , Prover9 20 , SNARK [34] , SPASS [37] and Vampire [31] .
Overall our system occupies a middle ground, solving more problems than several established provers, but it does not rank among the top-rated systems. However, for a first implementation of the new calculus we believe this is a promising start. The uniform strategy is a limitation at this point. At its core it remains the strategy used in the original Darwin for the non-equational ME-calculus, and which had to decide between new context literals and splits. For E-Darwin this was extended by the selection of derived clauses, but the current scheme may be too rigid to account for all different problem classes. Our testing has shown that minor changes to the selection heuristics of E-Darwin can have a significant effect on the time it takes to solve a problem. The heuristics settings used to achieve the test results above were chosen to maximize the number of proofs. While other settings would result in slightly less problems solved in total, these would nevertheless include some problems that are not solved under the optimal settings. One noteworthy such parameter concerns the selection frequency of clauses with at least one constraint literal and at least one non-constraint literal. Such clauses cannot be used for closing, they can add great complexity to the derivation as superposition premises, and their actual relevance for a proof is difficult to estimate beforehand. A minor adjustment to their selection rate can mean a difference between solving a problem in less than five seconds and the same problem requiring over five minutes. More elaborate lookahead functions could provide some guidance here. Also, when the effects can be so large, an approach based on time slices may be appropriate, with the prover testing several strategies during the time allowed for a proof.
Conclusions
We have presented the ME E calculus, an extension of the Model Evolution calculus [7, 9] by superposition-based inference rules for equality. The ME E calculus as presented here is an extensively revised and improved version of an earlier extension of Model Evolution by equality inference rules [8] . The differences are numerous and include a, we think, simpler presentation and much more powerful redundancy criteria.
Our main theoretical result is the correctness of ME E , in particular its completeness in combination with redundancy criteria. Our main practical result is the implementation in the E-Darwin system, described here for the first time. E-Darwin is a non-trivial extension of our earlier Darwin implementation. It performs reasonably well on the TPTP problem library and is able to solve six previously unsolved problems from that library.
As for future work, on the theoretical side, we plan to investigate how ME E can be exploited to obtain decision procedures for certain fragments of first-order logic that are beyond the scope of current superposition or instance-based methods. A key idea is to consider alternative formalisms to denote interpretations that are able to represent a larger class of infinite models, and adapt the derivation rules accordingly.
More on the applied side, it would be useful to investigate translations from practically interesting problems to fragments that can be decided by ME E . In particular, ME E is a decision procedure for function-free clause logic (like other instance-based methods) with equality, a class with a NEXPTIME-complete satisfiability problem. Problems from that class include satisfiability of SHOIQ knowledge bases, first-order model expansion (a certain kind of constraint satisfaction problems), satisfiability of formulas of the Ackermann class with equality, Satisfiability of DQBF (Dependency Quantified Boolean Formulas, a generalization of QBF), first-order logic with two variables and counting quantifiers, and more. The challenge here is to find practically useful reductions into function-free clause logic.
The E-Darwin implementation, although already quite sophisticated, could still be improved. One of the most promising options is perhaps to look into more refined heuristics and strategies for search space exploration. In particular, the currently used iterative deepening on term weights is often too inflexible for refutation finding. Sometimes it is easy to find a refutation by starting with a certain weight bound n, but iterative deepening will get stuck on exploring all smaller bounds within a set time limit.
Appendix A. Proofs
This appendix contains auxiliary lemmas, their proofs, and proofs of the results stated in the main part of this paper.
Lemma 6.2 Let l and r be ground Σ-terms with l r.
Proof. The statement (i) follows immediately from the definition of R Λ . Concerning (ii), suppose that l and r are irreducible wrt. R Λ . If Λ produces l → r we distinguish two cases. If R Λ generates l → r then l is reducible by l → r ∈ R Λ . If R Λ does not generate l → r then, by definition of R Λ , l or r must be reducible wrt. (R Λ ) l→r , hence reducible wrt. R Λ . Both cases thus contradict the assumption that l and r are irreducible wrt. R Λ . It follows that Λ does not produce l → r. Thanks to the presence of the pseudo-literal ¬x in every context, it is not difficult to see that every context produces K or K, for every literal K. Thus, with Λ not producing l → r we can conclude that Λ strongly produces l r.
Proof. Assume (i), (ii) and (iii). We have to show (Λ, R Λ ) | = (C · Γ, γ). 
By property (iii) of redundancy, C 1 γ 1 , . . . , C n γ n | = Cγ or C 1 γ 1 , . . . , C n γ n | = l ≈ r for some ground terms l and r with l r and such that Γγ is reducible by l → r.
In the first case conclude R Λ | = Cγ, and from that, trivially, (Λ, R Λ ) | = (C · Γ, γ), and nothing remains to be shown.
In the second case conclude R Λ | = l ≈ r with l and r as stated above. Because R Λ is a convergent rewrite system, the normal forms of l and of r wrt. R Λ are the same. Because l is greater wrt. than r, l must be reducible by some rule in l → r ∈ R Λ . But then, as Γγ is reducible by l → r, it is straightforward to see that Γγ is reducible by l → r as well. In other words, R Λ | = Γγ, contradicting the assumption (ii). Hence the second case is impossible.
is a relevant ground closure wrt. Λ, and (iii) Proof. It is obvious from Def. 6.7 that a clause that is redundant wrt. Λ Φ remains redundant if an arbitrary constrained clause is added to Φ; if a p-instance of another literal in Λ is deleted (by Compact) or a non-contradictory literal is added to Λ one needs to prove that, in terms of Def. 6.7, (C · Γ, γ) remains redundant wrt. Λ Φ and D. The non-trivial case is when Λ | = (Γ, γ) holds, but it is straightforward to check that Λ | = (Γ, γ) is preserved even then. To prove that a clause that is redundant wrt. Λ Φ remains redundant if redundant clauses are deleted from Φ, it suffices to show that the clauses C i · Γ i ∈ Φ in Definition 6.7 can always be chosen in such a way that they are not themselves redundant or their deletion does not affect redundancy of C·Γ: Suppose that a ground closure (C·Γ, γ) is redundant wrt. Λ Φ and D. Let { (C i ·Γ i , γ i ) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n } be a minimal set of ground closures of clauses in Φ (wrt. the multiset extension of the clause ordering) that satisfies the conditions of Definition 6.7. Suppose that one of the (C i · Γ i , γ i ), say (C 1 · Γ 1 , γ 1 ), is redundant itself. Then either Λ | = (Γ 1 , γ 1 ) and by condition (i) in Definition 6.7 it follows Λ | = (Γ, γ), and so (C ·Γ, γ) remains to be redundant, or there exist ground closures (C 1i · Γ 1i , γ 1i ) of constrained clauses C 1i · Γ 1i ∈ Φ that satisfy the conditions of Definition 6.7 for (
would also satisfy the conditions of Definition 6.7 for (C · Γ, γ), contradicting the min-
Lemma Appendix A.5 If a Deduce inference is redundant wrt. Λ Φ, Λ is obtained from Λ by deleting p-instances of other rewrite literals in Λ and/or by adding non-contradictory rewrite literals, and Φ is obtained from Φ by deleting constrained clauses that are redundant wrt. Λ Φ and/or by adding arbitrary constrained clauses, then this Deduce inference is redundant wrt. Λ Φ .
Proof. Analogously to the proof of Lemma Appendix A.4.
Lemma Appendix A.6 (ι Base -inferences Preserve Relevant Closures) Let Λ Φ be a sequent and assume an ι Base inference with right (or only) premise C · Γ, conclusion C · Γ , and a ground instance via γ of the ι Base inference such that (i) (C · Γ, γ) is a relevant closure of C · Γ wrt. Λ, (ii-a) in case of Sup-Neg or Sup-Pos, where l → r is the left premise and σ is the mgu used, l → r produces (l → r)σ in Λ, l → r produces (l → r)γ in Λ, and (l → r)γ generates the rule (l → r)γ in R Λ , and (ii-b) in case of Neg-Res, where l → r is the left premise and σ is the mgu used, ¬A produces (s t)σ in Λ, ¬A produces (s t)γ in Λ, and sγ and tγ are irreducible wrt. R Λ .
Then, (C · Γ , γ) is a relevant closure of C · Γ wrt. Λ.
Proof. For convenience we abbreviate R := R Λ below.
With (i), by Definitions 6.4 and 5.2 we have Λ | = (C · Γ, γ), i.e., Γγ is ordered and for every K L ∈ Γ, K produces L in Λ and K produces Lγ in Λ, and if l → r ∈ Γγ then l → r ∈ R, and if l r ∈ Γγ then l and r are irreducible wrt. R. We have to show
if l → r ∈ Γ γ then l → r ∈ R, and (4) if l r ∈ Γ γ then l and r are irreducible wrt. R.
The property (1) is easily obtained from inspection of the ι Base inference rules. It remains to show (2) , (3) and (4). Let σ be the used in the ι Base inference, as mentioned in case (ii-a) and (ii-b). Assume σ is idempotent, which is the case with usual unification algorithms. Because γ gives a ground instance of the given ι Base inference, γ must be a unifier for the same terms as σ. Because σ is a most general unifier, there is a substitution δ such that γ = σδ. With the idempotency of σ we get γ = σδ = σσδ = σγ.
For later use we prove some simple facts:
Proof: Assume K Lσ ∈ Γσ. We already know that K produces L in Λ and K produces Lγ in Λ. If K didn't produce Lσ in Λ then there would be a K ∈ ≥ Λ with K K Lσ. With γ = σδ and by transitivity of we would get K K Lγ, and so K would not produce Lγ either. With γ = σγ obtained above the second claim is trivial.
(ii) if l → r ∈ Γσγ then l → r ∈ R.
Proof: we already know that if l → r ∈ Γγ then l → r ∈ R. The claim then follows immediately with γ = σγ. (iii) if l r ∈ Γσγ then l and r are irreducible wrt. R. Proof: we already know that if l r ∈ Γγ then l and r are irreducible wrt. R. The claim then follows immediately with γ = σγ.
To prove (2), (3) and (4) we carry out a case analysis with respect to the ι Base inference rule applied.
In case of a Ref inference let the premise be s t ∨ C · Γ and the conclusion C · Γ = (C · Γ)σ. Recall that σ is not applied to context literals of constraints, and so the context literals of Γ and Γ are the same. But then (2) follows directly from fact (i). With Γ = Γσ, (3) follows immediately from fact (ii), and (4) follows immediately from fact (iii).
In case of a Sup-Neg inference let the left premise be l → r, the right premise
The proofs of (2), (3) and (4) for the subset Γσγ of Γ γ follows immediately from facts (i), (ii) and (iii), respectively. Now consider the sole additional element (l → r)σ that is in Γ but not in Γσ. Recall we are given that l → r produces (l → r)σ in Λ and that l → r produces (l → r)γ = (l → r)σγ in Λ, which proves (2). Regarding (3), recall we are given that (l → r)γ generates (l → r)γ in R, which entails (l → r)γ = (l → r)σγ ∈ R.
The proof for the case of a Sup-Pos inference is the same, and the proof for the case of a Neg-U-Res is similar and is omitted. Proof. Let Λ Φ be a saturated sequent with a non-contradictory context and suppose · ∅ Φ. To complete the proof of the first statement we show that every relevant closure (C · Γ, γ) wrt. Λ, of every constrained clause C · Γ ∈ Φ is canonically satisfied, i.e., satisfies the property
Λ is established we get the second statement R Λ | = Ψ by the following argumentation. Let Cγ be a ground instance of a clause C ∈ Ψ. It suffices to show R Λ | = Cγ. With Definition 6.4 it follows that every ground closure of a constrained clause with empty constraint is always relevant, for every pair (Λ, R). Hence, and more formally,
Recall that we have to show that every relevant closure of a clause in Φ wrt. Λ satisfies (P). We prove this be contradiction. If there is a relevant counterexample, that is, a relevant closure of a constrained clause in Φ wrt. Λ that does not satisfy (P), then, by well-foundedness of the clause ordering, there is a minimal such instance wrt. the clause ordering . From now on let (C · Γ, γ) be such a minimal relevant counterexample, for some C · Γ ∈ Φ.
By minimality of (C · Γ, γ), every relevant closure of a clause in Φ wrt. Λ that is smaller than (C · Γ, γ) wrt. satisfies (P). More formally, (Λ,
Φ, then by Lemma Appendix A.2, setting D = (C ·Γ, γ) there, (P) follows immediately, contradicting our assumption. Hence, (C ·Γ, γ) cannot be redundant wrt. Λ Φ.
(2) Var(C)γ is reducible wrt. R Λ .
The ME E calculus does not paramodulate into or below variables. To explain the completeness of this restriction we need to know that Var(C)γ is irreducible wrt. R Λ .
Because (C · Γ, γ) is a relevant closure wrt. Λ, we know R | = Γγ by Definition 6.4. First we show that every term in (Var(C) ∩ Var(Γ))γ is irreducible wrt. R Λ . If there were such a term, reducible wrt. R Λ , occurring in a negative rewrite literal l r ∈ Γγ then we would immediately get a contradiction to R | = Γγ. If there were such a term occurring in a positive rewrite literal l → r ∈ Γγ then l → r is reducible by a smaller rule from R Λ , and hence l → r cannot be generated in R Λ , again contradicting R | = Γγ. An important detail for this argumentation to hold is that, by construction, Γ does not contain rewrite literals of the form x → t, where x is a variable.
If xγ is reducible for some x ∈ Var(C) \ Var(Γ), then a term in the range of γ can be replaced by a smaller yet congruent term wrt. R Λ . Observe that this results in a smaller (wrt. ) relevant counterexample, thus contradicting the choice of (C · Γ, γ).
In summary, thus, Var(C)γ is irreducible wrt. R Λ . 
, and so R Λ | = (s ≈ t)γ. Because R Λ is a convergent (ordered) rewrite system, sγ and tγ must have the same normal forms. In particular, thus, sγ is reducible wrt. R Λ . Suppose sγ = (sγ)[l] p for some position p and rule l → r ∈ R Λ . With Lemma 6.2-(i) it follows that Λ produces l → r. For later use let l → r ∈ ∼ Λ be a fresh variant of a rewrite literal that produces l → r in Λ and assume that γ has already been extended so that (l → r )γ = l → r.
The conclusions so far give that Deduce is applicable with underlying ground SupNeg inference with left premise (l → r )γ, right premise sγ[l γ] p tγ ∨ Dγ · Γγ and conclusion sγ[r γ] p tγ ∨ Dγ · Γγ, l → r (l → r )γ. The next step is to show that this ground inference is a ground instance via γ of a Sup-Neg inference with premises l → r and C ·Γ = s[u] p t∨D·Γ and conclusion (s[r ] p t∨D·Γ, l → r l → r )σ, where σ is an mgu of l and u. This follows from the observation that the position p in s indeed exists and that u cannot be a variable, because otherwise uγ is reducible wrt. R Λ (the rule l → r would rewrite uγ, as l = uγ), but we know that Var(C)γ is irreducible wrt. R Λ . It is safe to assume that σ is idempotent, which gives us σγ = γ.
By saturation, the Deduce inference is redundant wrt. Λ Φ. Because the closure (C · Γ, γ) of the premise C · Γ is not redundant wrt. Λ Φ, the instantiated conclusion (as a closure) ((s[r ] p t ∨ D · Γ, l → r l → r )σ, γ) must be redundant wrt. Λ Φ and (C · Γ, γ) by definition of redundant inferences. Furthermore, with Lemma Appendix A.6 it is a relevant closure wrt. Λ, hence, by Lemma Appendix
However, with the conclusion (as a closure) being a relevant closure, Λ | = ((Γ ∪ {l → r l → r })σ, γ) is impossible, and
From the latter conclude immediately R Λ | = (s ≈ t)γ, and so sγ = tγ is impossible. Hence suppose sγ tγ. We distinguish two further cases. If sγ and tγ are irreducible wrt. R Λ then assume, w.l.o.g., sγ tγ. With Lemma 6.2-(ii) then conclude that some literal ¬A ∈ Λ produces (s t)γ in Λ. This indicates that a Deduce inference with an underlying ground Neg-Res inference exists. More precisely, the left premise of that ground inference is (s t)γ, the right premise is (s ≈ t ∨ D · Γ)γ and the conclusion is (D · Γ, ¬A s t)γ. It is routine by now to check that this ground Neg-Res inference is a ground instance via γ of a Neg-Res inference with a right premise from Φ that is not redundant wrt. Λ Φ, and the left premise ¬A.
The rest of the proof uses the same arguments as in case (3.2) and is omitted (we can show that the Deduce inference with the latter underlying Neg-Res inference exists, which will yield a contradiction to the conclusion R Λ | = (s ≈ t ∨ D)γ drawn for case (4) above).
Suppose C · Γ = · Γ. By assumption · ∅ Φ, and so Γ ∅ and ( · ∅, γ) Φ gr . First we are going to show that Split is applicable to Λ Φ with selected clause · Γ ∈ Φ. Because ( · Γ, γ) is a relevant closure of · Γ wrt. Λ, by Definition 6.4, Λ produces every literal in Γ. More specifically, L produces L in Λ and L produces Lγ in Λ, for every L L ∈ Γ. If Close were applicable, then, by saturation, this Close inference would be redundant, which is the case only if · ∅ ∈ Φ, which we have already excluded. Hence, Close is not applicable, and there is a literal K ∈ Γ such that (i) K is variable-disjoint with Γ \ {K} and there is no K ∈ ≥ Λ with K K , or otherwise (ii) there is no K ∈ ≥ Λ with K ∼ K. In case (i) conclude that K sko is not contradictory with Λ, and in case (ii) conclude that L is not contradictory with Λ, where L is a variable-free variant of K.
In order to show that Split is applicable we still need to know that in case (i) K is not contradictory with Λ, and in case (ii) that L is not contradictory with Λ. Both cases follow easily from Definition 4.3 and the conclusion above that Λ produces every literal in Γ. In case (i), thus, U-Split is applicable, and in case (ii) P-Split is applicable with selected clause · Γ and split literal K and L, respectively.
Again using the conclusion above that Λ produces every literal in Γ, it follows that the considered Split inference is not redundant wrt. Λ Φ. However, by saturation it is redundant wrt. Λ Φ, a plain contradiction.
Proof. We prove the claim for each derivation rule of ME E . U-Split) Let Λ Φ be the premise sequent and let Λ, L Φ and Λ, L sko Φ be the two conclusion sequents. Suppose that Λ Φ is a-satisfiable. Note that L and L a have exactly the same variables and let x be an enumeration of them. Φ is a-satisfiable.
P-Split) Analogous to the previous case.
Close) Let Λ Φ, · K 1 , . . . , K n be the premise sequent and Λ Φ, · ∅ the conclusion sequent. Since, trivially, Λ a ∪ (Φ, · ∅) c is E-unsatisfiable, we must show that Λ a ∪ (Φ, · K 1 , . . . , K n ) c is too. For that, it is enough to show that Λ a ∪ {K 1 ∨ · · · ∨ K n } is E-unsatisfiable. 21 By the rule's definition for every i = 1, . . . , n there is a L i ∈ ≥ Λ such that K i L i if K i is variable-disjoint with Γ \ K i and K i ∼ L i otherwise. This means that there exist L 1 , . . . , L n ∈ ≥ Λ such that the sets
. . , {L a n , K n } admit a simultaneous unifier σ. As a consequence, the set {L a 1 , . . . , L a n , K 1 ∨ · · · ∨ K n } is unsatisfiable, and hence E-unsatisfiable. To see that Λ a ∪ {K 1 ∨ · · · ∨ K n } is Eunsatisfiable it is enough to observe that Λ a | = L a i for each i = 1, . . . , n. Compact) Immediate.
Assert) Let Λ Φ be the premise sequent and Λ, L Φ the conclusion sequent where
Clearly, every E-interpretation that satisfies Λ a ∪ Φ c is also a model of Λ a ∪ {L a } ∪ Φ c which is the same as (Λ ∪ {L}) a ∪ Φ c .
Simp) Let Λ Φ, C · Γ be the premise sequent and Λ Φ, C · Γ the conclusion sequent where Λ a ∪ (Φ ∪ {C · Γ}) c | = (C · Γ ) c . The argument is analogous to the previous case. Proposition 7.2 For all sets Ψ of Σ-clauses, if Ψ has a refutation tree then Ψ is Eunsatisfiable.
Proof. Let T Ψ be a refutation tree of a set Ψ = {C 1 , . . . , C n } of parameter-free Σ-clauses. We prove below by structural induction that the root of any subtree of T Ψ is a-unsatisfiable. This will entail in particular that ¬v Φ 0 , the root of T Ψ itself, is a-unsatisfiable, where Φ 0 = {C 1 · ∅, . . . , C n · ∅}. The claim will then follow from the immediate fact that the sequent ¬v Φ 0 is a-unsatisfiable iff {¬v} a ∪ Φ c 0 , which coincides with Ψ, has no satisfying E-interpretation.
Let T be a subtree of T Ψ and let N be its root. If T is a one-node tree, since T Ψ is a refutation tree, N can only have the form Λ Φ, · ∅, which is clearly a-unsatisfiable. If T has more than one node, we can assume by induction that all the children nodes of N are a-unsatisfiable. But then we can conclude that N is a-unsatisfiable as well by the contrapositive of Lemma 7.1.
Lemma Appendix A.10 Let C · Γ be a constrained clause. If C · Γ is redundant wrt. Λ j Φ j , for some j < κ, then C · Γ is redundant wrt. Λ B Φ B .
Proof. The proof works in essentially the same way as in [3] . Lemma Appendix A.11 Every Deduce inference that is redundant wrt. Λ j Φ j , for some j < κ, is redundant wrt. Λ B Φ B .
Proof. Analogously to the proof of Lemma Appendix A.10 using Lemma Appendix A.5. Proof. Suppose B is an exhausted branch of a limit tree of some fair derivation. We have to show that every ME E inference with a mandatory derivation rule with premise Λ B Φ B is redundant wrt. Λ B Φ B . We do this by assuming such an inference and carrying out a case analysis wrt. the derivation rule applied.
By Definition 7.3 there is no Close inference with premise Λ i Φ i , for no i < κ, with a persistent closing clause and persistent closing literals. But then there is no Close inference with premise Λ B Φ B either. (Because if so, for a large enough i there would be Close inference with premise Λ i Φ i , which we excluded.) Thus there is nothing to show for Close.
If the derivation rule is Split then let · Γ be the selected clause. There are only finitely many literals K, modulo renaming and modulo sign, that are more general than a given literal or set of literals such as Γ. The applicability conditions of the derivation rules makes sure that from some time k onwards, no more such literal K will be added to or removed from Λ k , Λ k+1 , . . .. (See Lemma 4.14 in [9] for a proof). We are given that · Γ is persistent. Therefore suppose also · Γ ∈ Λ k , Λ k+1 , . . ., or choose k big enough. Together this shows that a Split inference with premise Λ i Φ i exists (i could be k or smaller). By Definition 7.3 then, the Split inference is redundant wrt. Λ j Φ j , for some j < κ with j ≥ i. By redundancy, this means that the selected clause · Γ is redundant wrt. Λ j Φ j . Now use Lemma Appendix A.10 to conclude that · Γ is redundant wrt. Λ B Φ B , and so the Split inference with selected clause · Γ is redundant wrt. Λ B Φ B .
If the derivation rule is Deduce then by Definition 7.3 it is redundant wrt. Λ j Φ j , for some j ≥ i, and by Lemma Appendix A.11 it is redundant wrt. Λ B Φ B .
Theorem 7.5 (Completeness) Let Ψ be a Σ-clause set and T be the limit tree of a fair derivation of Ψ. If T is not a refutation tree then Ψ is satisfiable; more specifically, for every exhausted branch B of T with limit sequent Λ B Φ B it holds Λ B , R 
